Doublethink ing Privacy under the Multi-State Antiterrorism Information Exchange by Burch, Thomas V.
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2004
"Doublethink"ing Privacy under the Multi-State
Antiterrorism Information Exchange
Thomas Burch
Director, Appellate Litigation Clinic
University of Georgia School of Law, tvburch@uga.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Repository Citation
Thomas V. Burch, "Doublethink"ing Privacy under the Multi-State Antiterrorism Information Exchange , 29 Seton Hall Legis. J. 147
(2004),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1203
"DOUBLETHINK"ING PRIVACY UNDER THE
MULTI-STATE ANTITERRORISM INFORMATION
EXCHANGE'
Thomas V. Burch *
"Historically, the greatest threat to personal privacy has been the
State. It still is. Jealous of its own secrets, the government covets
ours."
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. IN TRO D U CTION ..................................................................... 148
II. THE POLITICS OF FEAR ....................................................... 151
A . A lien and Sedition A cts ...................................................... 151
B. World War I and the First Red Scare ................................. 153
C. The FBI and CIA War on Communism ............................. 156
* B.A., B.B.A., Mississippi State University; J.D., Florida State University; Associate at
King & Spalding in Atlanta. I would like to thank Beth (for everything, and then some) and
Professor Steven Gey for taking the time to talk with me about this article and life in
general. I couldn't have written this without either of you. As always, any errors are my
own.
I GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 82-83 (Centennial ed. 2003) (1949). "Doublethink" was the
guiding principle of the Big Brother Party in George Orwell's 1984. Id. Essentially,
"doublethink" referred to the Party's ability to shape its followers' beliefs in a manner that
defied common sense and logic. Id. Followers of the Party believed that if the Party said it,
then it must have been true. Id.
In the end the Party would announce that two and two make five, and you
would have to believe it. It was inevitable that they should make that claim
sooner or later: the logic of their position demanded it. Not merely the validity
of experience, but the very existence of external reality was tacitly denied by
their philosophy. The heresy of heresies was common sense.
Id. Matrix officials are currently applying this logic anytime someone challenges the
appropriateness of the Matrix system. Robert O'Harrow, Jr., U.S. Backs Florida's New
Counterterrorism Database: "Matrix" Offers Law Agencies Faster Access to Americans'
Personal Records, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2003, at Al. They religiously refer to the "war on
terror" in an effort to sway public opinion in favor of the program, believing that if they
mention the phrase often enough, the public will begin to believe that the Matrix is a
virtuous system, only aimed at ending the terrorist threat. Id.
2 CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 155 (1999).
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L Introduction
James Madison believed that the great difficulty in creating a
government of "men over men" lies in the following challenge: "you
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the
next place oblige it to control itself."3 Succeeding in this challenge is
especially difficult during times of national crisis. As the dangers to
national security increase, civil liberties decrease. The relationship is
both automatic and axiomatic. However, history has not clearly defined
the extent to which individual civil liberties should suffer in the face of
national exigencies. How much control over the individual should the
government assume in the name of national defense?
The current "war on terror" provides an apt example. In the name
of national security, the government has recently instituted several law
enforcement programs that pose serious threats to individual privacy. In
2002, for example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
("DARPA") created Total Information Awareness ("TIA"), a data
surveillance program that the Pentagon could use to "detect, classify,
and identify potential foreign terrorists."4 However, DARPA designed
3 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison).
4 DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS
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the TIA to collect extensive records on all American citizens, regardless
of whether they had ties to terrorist organizations. The system
contained magazine subscription lists, credit records, and - through its
use of commercial databases that collect records from the internet -
several other types of highly personal information.6 When Congress
learned about the true extent of the TIA program, it immediately passed
a moratorium on the program's funding.'
Far from being deterred, however, the executive branch of the
federal government responded by attempting to establish the same type
of system through state cooperation. In 2003, the Justice Department
and the Department of Homeland Security pledged $12 million to the
Multi-State Antiterrorism Information Exchange ("Matrix"), a Florida-
based program that is strikingly similar to the TIA.8 Proponents say the
REGARDING THE TERRORISM INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAM 3 (May 20, 2003)
[hereinafter DARPA REPORT] (emphasis added). The program's original name was Total
Information Awareness; however, after critics began to raise privacy concerns about the
TIA, the Pentagon changed the program's name from Total Information Awareness to
Terrorism Information Awareness. Id. The name change was not successful in quelling
those privacy concerns. See Carl Hulse, Congress Shuts Pentagon Unit Over Privacy, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2003, at A20.
5 See William Safire, You are a Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at A35.
6 See id. The Pentagon planned to enter this information into what it termed a "virtual,
centralized grand database." Id.
Modern technology has made it possible to create vast new dossiers of
extraordinary detail and specificity about our tastes, habits, and lives. Every
time you apply for a job, subscribe to a magazine, call a mail-order catalog, use
a credit card, dial a phone, seek credit, fly on an airplane, buy insurance, rent an
apartment, drive a car, pay taxes, get married or divorced, sue someone, see a
doctor, use a smart card, apply for government licenses or benefits, you become
part of the dataweb, which has proven far more powerful than the paper trails of
bygone years.
SYKES, supra note 2, at 5; see also Barry Steinhardt, Liberty in the Age of Technology,
GLOBAL AGENDA, Jan. 16, 2004, at 154 (examining the need for restraints on the use of
technology to protect privacy), available at http://www.globalagendamagazine.com/2004/
barrysteinhardt.asp (last visited March 23, 2004).
7 See Hulse, supra note 4. When Congress learned that the Pentagon, as part of the
overall TIA project, was developing a terrorism futures market where traders could wager
on the likelihood of terrorist events or political assassinations, it forced the Pentagon to
close its Information Awareness Office within a day. Id.
8O'Harrow, Jr., supra note 1. One of the more striking similarities between the
Matrix and the TIA is that both programs were designed by persons with criminal histories.
Id. Admiral Poindexter, creator of the TIA, has a conviction for five felony counts of lying
to Congress, obstructing a congressional inquiry, and destroying official documents. See
Total Information Awareness, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2002, at A20; Safire, supra note 5.
Likewise, Hank Asher, the founder of Seislnt, is a known drug smuggler. O'Harrow, supra
note 1. "In 1999, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the FBI suspended information
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Matrix simply allows law enforcement to share and access data that can
help in the fight against terrorism.9  Critics say the Matrix
unconstitutionally invades privacy. ' This Article examines the
development of the Matrix program and analyzes its effect on what
Justices Warren and Brandeis termed the individual's "right to be let
alone.""
To understand the Matrix's effect on individual privacy, one must
scrutinize the program in the context of United States history. From the
Alien and Sedition Acts to the Red Squads of the 1960s and 1970s, Part
II of this Article examines how civil liberties often suffer unnecessarily
in times of national crisis. Part III then discusses how this truism
applies in the current "war on terror" and details the development and
operation of the Matrix system, along with that of its predecessor, the
Pentagon's Total Information Awareness. Both programs, like the
Alien and Sedition Acts and the Red Squads before, raise serious
privacy concerns and deserve additional scrutiny.
Finally, Part IV recognizes that, while the government should have
the surveillance power necessary to strengthen national security, any
exercise of the government's surveillance power must give "regard to
the public good and to the sense of the people."'2 More specifically,
Part IV analyzes the Matrix in the context of the constitutional
protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. However,
realizing that these protections may not be broad enough to effectively
control the Matrix program, Part IV also discusses the possibility of
involving state legislatures in the privacy battle. Currently, state
legislatures may be the only governmental body capable of protecting
individual privacy from the executive branch's constitutional excess.
service contracts with an earlier Asher-run company because of concerns about his past."
Id.
9 See Susan Gast, Matrix and Privacy: Debate Over Information Hits Close to Home,
ATLANTA J. CONST., Oct. 19, 2003, at F1 (statement of Gerald M. Haskins, Professor of
Computer and Information Science and Engineering, University of Florida).
10 See id.
11 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv.
193, 194 (1890). While Thomas Cooley actually came up with the phrase "the right to be
let alone," Warren and Brandeis popularized it in their 1890 article. SYKES, supra note 2, at
91-92.
12 THE FEDERALIST No. 31 (Alexander Hamilton).
13 See infra Part IV.C.
[Vol. 29:1
"DOUBLETHINK"ING PRIVACY
II. The Politics of Fear
From the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 to the Red Squads of the
1960s and 1970s, "United States history reveals that the state and
federal governments have rarely passed up the temptation offered by the
'pressing exigencies of crisis' to enlarge their power and serve ulterior
motives, at the expense of constitutional rights. ' 4  Yet, as Justice
Marshall once noted, "when we allow fundamental freedoms to be
sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exigency, we invariably
come to regret it."'5 The following examples of our government's past
constitutional infringements place the Matrix in perspective and serve as
reminders to closely scrutinize government programs like the Matrix
that attempt to circumscribe constitutional liberties.
A. Alien and Sedition Acts
During the summer of 1798, only seven years after the ratification
of the Constitution, John Adams convinced the Federalist majority in
Congress to pass a sedition act, which, once enacted, would fine and
imprison "any person who shall write, print, utter or publish.., any
false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the
government of the United States."'6 Nominally passed to diminish the
domestic impact of the French Revolution, the Sedition Act was
actually a flawed effort by Adams to maintain control over the young
Republican Party and Adams' Republican Vice President Thomas
Jefferson. 7 "Under the guise of patriotic purpose and internal security,
14 Nancy Murray & Sarah Wunsch, Civil Liberties in Times of Crisis: Lessons from
History, 87 MASS. L. REv. 72, 73 (2002).
15 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
16 William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of
Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 91, 123 (1984) (quoting Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1
Stat. 596, 596). The Sedition Act was one of four acts passed within a four week period in
July of 1798 commonly known as the Alien and Sedition Acts. Gregory Fehlings, Storm on
the Constitution: The First Deportation Law, 10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 63, 65 (2002).
The other three were the Alien Act, the Alien Enemies Act, and the Naturalization Act. Id
17 Murray & Wunsch, supra note 14, at 73. Jefferson condemned the Alien and
Sedition Acts in words that resonate today, given that programs like the Matrix are
nominally aimed at "fighting terrorism." Id. According to Jefferson, "the friendless alien
has indeed been selected as the safest subject of a first experiment; but the citizen will soon
follow, or rather, has already followed, for already has a sedition act marked him as its
prey... " Id. at 74 (quoting the Original Draft of the Kentucky Resolution, October,
1798).
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the Federalists enacted a program designed to cripple, if not destroy, the
Jeffersonian party." 8 In fact, the Act purposefully protected Federalist
incumbents from criticism and conveniently expired on the last day of
the Adams Administration.' 9
Before the Act expired, however, the government prosecuted
seventeen people, and the press considerably reduced its criticism of
government officials." A number of anti-Federalist newspapers even
went out of business.21  Significantly, these events encouraged a
growing opposition to the Act that contributed to Thomas Jefferson's
election as the next President of the United States.22  When Jefferson
took office, he pardoned everyone convicted under the Act. 3
Yet, the long-term damage of the Act was irreversible. The
Federalists claimed that the power to enact such a law was an implied
right, "one of the now common 'national security' variety."24 Thus, the
Federalists set an early precedent for future governments to follow:
allowing reliance on national security as a valid reason for passing
18 JAMES M. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS, THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND
AMERICAN CIvIL LIBERTIES 21 (1956). The doctrine of seditious libel originated in England
in 1606 when the crown prosecutor argued that the written defamation of public officials
constituted a separate offense from private libel. David Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798
and the Incorporation of Seditious Libel into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 154, 160-61 (2001). According to the crown prosecutor, such libels were more
severe than their private counterparts because they potentially harmed the stability of the
state. Id. at 161.
19 Mayton, supra note 16, at 124. The only notable federal office that the Act did not
cover was the Vice Presidency, which was then the office of Thomas Jefferson, a
Republican. Id. At this point in history, the Presidential candidate with the second highest
vote total became the Vice President. Murray & Wunsch, supra note 14, at 73.
20 Murray & Wunsch, supra note 14, at 73. One of the seventeen prosecuted under the
Act included a Congressman from Vermont. Jenkins, supra note 18, at 156.
21 Murray & Wunsch, supra note 14, at 73.
22 Jenkins, supra note 18, at 156. Additionally, while the Supreme Court never ruled on
the Act's constitutionality, it has since recognized "a broad consensus that the Act ... was
inconsistent with the First Amendment." See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
276 (1964).
23 Murray & Wunsch, supra note 14, at 74. In a letter to President Adams' wife,
Jefferson stated: "I discharged every person under punishment or prosecution under the
sedition law, because I considered, and now consider, that law to be a nullity, as absolute
and as palpable as if Congress had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden image."
See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276. "The abuses inflicted under that law did not end with the
Adams administration, however, for Jefferson urged retaliation against publishers of
Federalist newspapers, and some were prosecuted for common-law seditious libel." Murray
& Wunsch, supra note 14, at 74.
24 Mayton, supra note 16, at 124.
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legislation that tests the boundaries of the Constitution - even when the
true focus of the legislation is not national security, as was the case with
the Sedition Act.25
B. World War I and the First Red Scare
In 1888, Justice Samuel Freeman Miller lectured a graduating class
from the University of Iowa about the growing communist threat and
warned the students about socialists and leftists that "come here and
form clubs and associations; they meet at night and in secluded places;
they get together large quantities of deadly weapons; they drill and
prepare themselves for organized warfare; they stimulate riots and
invasions of the public peace; they glory in strikes."26 Over the next
thirty years, work stoppages, anarchist bombings, and political
assassinations - all of which became popularly associated with what
Justice Miller might call a "communist plot" - created an Anti-Red
hysteria that resembles the fear of terrorism today.27
25 See id. at 123-24.
This act could have hardly been a starker instance of self-serving politics. The
Federalists, following the usual rules of political oppression, had identified an
enemy without, the French, with agents within, and among these domestic
agents was a "seditious" press. But undoubtedly, this Federalist talk of internal
enemies was not more than poor camouflage for a measure favoring
incumbency.
Id.
26 William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The
Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 SuP. CT. REV. 375, 380-81 (citing Samuel
Freeman Miller, The Conflict in This Country Between Socialism and Organized Society,
Address at the University of Iowa (1888), in CHARLES N. GREGORY, SAMUEL FREEMAN
MILLER 168 (1907)). With the exception of the last clause, Justice Miller could just as easily
have been speaking about terrorists in the year 2004.
27 See Murray & Wunsch, supra note 14, at 75-76 ("Anarchism then inspired fears
similar to terrorism today."); see also Harlan Grant Cohen, Note, The (Un)favorable
Judgment of History: Deportation Hearings, The Palmer Raids, and the Meaning of
History, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1431, 1433 (2003) (comparing the communist threat to the
terrorist threat). In comparing the government's reaction to communism in the early 20th
Century to the current administration's war on terrorism, Mr. Cohen cites a 1920 report
from the National Popular Government League - whose members included Roscoe Pound,
Felix Frankfurter, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and Tyrell Williams - which states:
Under the guise of a campaign for the suppression of radical activities the office
of the Attorney General acting by its local agents throughout the country, and
giving express instructions from Washington has committed continual illegal
acts. Wholesale arrests both of aliens and citizens have been made without
warrant or any process of law; men and women have been jailed and held
incomunicado [sic] without access of friends or counsel; homes have been
SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 29:1
The first Red Scare coincided with the development of the First
World War." With Anti-Red sentiment growing, Congress passed the
Espionage Act of 1917, which criminalized interference with military
recruitment.29 Soon after, with World War I well under way, Congress
passed the Sedition Act of 1918 which, like the Sedition Act of 1798,
was designed to punish political dissent. It did not take long for
zealous prosecutors to start relying on these Acts to fill prisons with
"anti-war protestors, striking workers, and immigrants believed to be
entered without search-warrant and property seized and removed; other
property has been wantonly destroyed; workingmen and workingwomen
suspected of radical views have been shamefully abused and maltreated. Agents
of the Department of Justice have been introduced into radical organizations for
the purpose of informing upon their members or inciting them to activities;
these agents have even been instructed from Washington to arrange meetings
upon certain dates for the express object of facilitating wholesale raids and
arrests. In support of these illegal acts, and to create sentiment in its favor, the
Department of Justice has also constituted itself a propaganda bureau, and has
sent to newspapers and magazines of this country quantities of material
designed to excite public opinion against radicals, all at the expense of the
government and outside the scope of the Attorney General's duties.
Id. at 1431-32 (quoting THE NAT'L POPULAR Gov'T LEAGUE, REPORT UPON THE ILLEGAL
PRACTICES OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1-2 (1920)). According to
many, the Bush Administration's USA PATRIOT ACT is accomplishing the same type of
unjust objectives as the Sedition Acts of 1798 and 1918. See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy
Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953, 966-74 (2002); see also Will Thomas DeVries, Note,
Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283, 283 (2003) ("The
[PATRIOT ACT's] overall effect.., has had less to do with terrorism than with easing
restrictions on government surveillance of digital communications.")
28 Murray & Wunsch, supra note 14, at 76.
29 Espionage Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (2000). The version of the Espionage Act
that President Wilson submitted to Congress provided for a $10,000 fine and ten years in
jail for any person publishing information that could be useful or possibly useful to the
enemy. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 173-74 (1998). A presidential
proclamation would determine what constituted "useful" or "possibly useful." Id. Wilson
insisted that such censorship was necessary for the public safety and that it was imperative
for Congress to pass his version of the legislation. Id. However, the House of
Representatives vetoed Wilson's version of the bill by a vote of 184 to 144. Id.
30 REHNQUIST, supra note 29, at 173 (citing 54 CONG. REC. 95-100 (1917)). President
Wilson was very active in his support of measures to suppress political dissent. Id. In a
message to Congress on December 7, 1915, Wilson stated:
The gravest threats against our national peace and safety have been uttered
within our own borders. There are citizens of the United States, I blush to
admit, born under other flags but welcomed by our generous nationalization
laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America, who have poured the
poison and disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life.
Id. Congress repealed the Sedition Act in 1921, only three years after it was enacted. Id. at
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dangerously radical."31 The prosecutors received assistance in this fight
from a private organization, the American Protective League (APL),
which worked with the Justice Department to track internal enemies.
The APL had thousands of members across the country who conducted
surveillance on dissidents, harassed activists, and detained people
described as having "questionable" loyalty.33 The group also raided
factories, union halls, and private homes, and "arrested" approximately
40,000 people on behalf of the War Department.34
Even after the War ended, the strikes, riots, and political dissent, as
well as the government's prosecutions of these crimes, continued. 5 To
help suppress these activities, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer
asked J. Edgar Hoover to compile a list of radicals; that list eventually
grew to over 450,000 names, including future Supreme Court Justices
Felix Frankfurter and Arthur Goldberg.36 Palmer also relied on the
Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918 to quell the radical
left. The most effective tool at Palmer's disposal, however, was the
Alien Control Act of 1918, which prohibited foreigners who believed in
overthrowing the U.S. government from entering the country.38 Palmer
used the Act to arrest and deport suspected radicals that were already
here.39
31 Murray & Wunsch, supra note 14, at 76. The government prosecuted over two
thousand people under the Espionage and Sedition Acts. Id.
32 Id
33 Id.
34 Id. This is similar to how the State of Florida is currently working with a private
organization, SeisInt, Inc., to develop a database containing records on the citizens of the
five states participating in the Matrix program. See O'Harrow, supra note 1.
35 See Cohen, supra note 27, at 1453-56. After the war, labor unions began reasserting
control over employers and the bargaining process. Id. In January of 1919, harbor workers,
cigar makers and dressmakers in New York began to strike. Id. They were soon followed
by rail workers in New Jersey and a general strike in Seattle. Id. Many of the strikes
included violence, and the labor movement became further entwined with the public's
notion of left-wing revolution. Id. at 1455-56.
36 Murray & Wunsch, supra note 14, at 77-79.
37 Cohen, supra note 27, at 1457. The government prosecuted more than two thousand
people under the Espionage Act between June 30, 1917 and June 30, 1921. Id. More than a
thousand of these prosecutions resulted in convictions. (The Sedition Act was an
amendment to the Espionage Act so these figures include prosecutions under the Sedition
Act as well.) REHNQUIST, supra note 29, at 182-83. For an example of the type of
publications that could lead to prosecution and conviction under the Sedition Act, see
Abrams v. United States, 40 S. Ct. 17 (1919).
38 Cohen, supra note 27, at 1457.
39 Id.
2004]
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Throughout January of 1920, Palmer planned and executed a series
of raids on homes, pool halls, bowling alleys, and other "leftist"
meeting places in thirty-three cities across the United States." Primarily
targeting Russian and Eastern European immigrants, the raids resulted
in over 10,000 arrests, most of which were made without warrants or
probable cause.41 Significantly, Palmer's Justice Department adopted an
internal rule that simple membership in groups, such as the Union of
Russian Workers or the Communist Party, qualified individuals for
deportation under the Alien Control Act. 2 Relying on this internal rule,
Palmer began deporting the members of communist groups that police
arrested in the raids. 3 After the fact, it became apparent that most
people on these membership rolls were unaware of their membership in
the groups." Louis Post, the Assistant Secretary of Labor, later
admitted that very few of the immigrants arrested were the kind of
people that Congress intended to deport under the Act.45 Thus, Palmer
and the Justice Department misused the Alien Control Act in an effort
to promote national security through the deportation of suspected
communists.46
C. The FBI and CIA War on Communism
Over the next fifty years, the federal government continued to
establish new laws and agencies to combat perceived international
threats. Under the National Security Act of 1947, Congress established
the Central Intelligence Agency "as the nation's first comprehensive
peacetime foreign intelligence service. '47 The objective of the CIA was
40 Murray & Wunsch, supra note 14, at 78.
41 Id.
42 Cohen, supra note 27, at 1458. Around this same time, the House of Representatives
considered a bill that would have imposed the death penalty for aiding in an insurrection.
See A Bill to Punish Offenses Against the Existence of the Government of the United
States, and for Other Purposes, H.R. 11430, 66th Cong. § 2 (1920).
43 See Murray & Wunsch, supra note 14, at 78.
44 Cohen, supra note 27, at 1463.
45 Id. at 1462. Post also admitted that only forty or fifty of the thousands arrested
actually supported an overthrow of the United States government. Id. at 1463.
46 See id.
47 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE
UNITED STATES 10 (June 1975) [hereinafter ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION REPORT], available
at http://history-matters.com/archive/church/rockcomm/contents.htm (last visited Mar. 6,
2004). President Ford created the Rockefeller Commission to investigate whether the CIA
was overstepping its intended authority. Id. at 3.
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to provide the President with coordinatedforeign intelligence, which the
country lacked prior to Pearl Harbor.48 Congress did not create the CIA
to replace or assist the FBI in conducting domestic investigations.
Indeed, to ensure the public "that it was not establishing a secret police
which would threaten the civil liberties of Americans," Congress
specifically prohibited the CIA from exercising "police, subpoena, or
law-enforcement powers or internal security functions."5
Nevertheless, shortly after its founding, the CIA began to overstep
the boundaries of its intended authority.5' Under pressure from
President Johnson, CIA Director Richard Helms initiated a series of
reports on American dissidence both at home and abroad.52 One of the
papers, titled "Restless Youth," included a detailed section on the
demonstration tactics of American students.53  Recognizing the
impropriety of the CIA's involvement in such a study, Helms attached a
memo to the President on this report, which stated:
In an effort to round-out our discussion of this subject, we have
included a section on American students. This is an area not within
the charter of this Agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely
sensitive this makes the paper. Should anyone learn of its existence
it would prove most embarrassing for all concerned.54
Thus, even though Congress specifically prohibited the CIA from
monitoring the domestic activities of American citizens, the CIA
knowingly gathered information on American students' political
dissidence. 55  Furthermore, the CIA did not limit its domestic
48 Id. at 10-11.
49 Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
50 Id.
51 See id at 130-50. "The Presidential demands upon the CIA appear to have caused
the Agency to forgo, to some extent, the caution with which it might otherwise have
approached [domestic investigations] .... These White House demands ... seem to have
encouraged top CIA management to stretch and, on some occasions, to exceed the
legislative restrictions." Id. at 131. Part of the problem stemmed from a lack of oversight.
"The excessive secrecy surrounding Operation CHAOS, its isolation within the CIA, and its
removal from the normal chain of command prevented any effective supervision and review
of its activities by officers not directly involved in the project." Id.
52 Id. at 132. The CIA, unlike the FBI, generally produced finished, evaluated
intelligence. See id. Presumably, this is the reason that President Johnson asked Helms, as
Director of Central Intelligence, to compile a "coordinated evaluation of intelligence
bearing upon the question of dissidence." Id.
53 ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 47, at 134.
54 Id. at 134.
55 Id. at 130.
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surveillance to American students alone.56  Through a Special
Operations Group commonly known as Operation CHAOS, the CIA
created more than 7,200 files on citizens of varying backgrounds. 7
These files- included approximately 300,000 names of persons and
organizations.5 Seventy-five of the persons were members of
Congress. One CIA agent even became an advisor in a United States
congressional campaign and furnished reports to the CIA of behind-the-
scenes campaign activities.0
Around this same time, the FBI also ran a series of covert
operations - which it called Counter Intelligence Programs
("COINTELPROs") - aimed at suppressing movements for social
change.61 During the course of these operations, J. Edgar Hoover
created files on more than 450,000 Americans.62 However, Hoover
went beyond simply collecting files to undertaking "secret action
designed to 'disrupt' and 'neutralize' target groups and individuals."63
His agency's techniques ranged from "mailing anonymous letters to a
[target's] spouse accusing the target of infidelity... to contacting an
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Murray & Wunsch, supra note 14, at 81.
60 ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 47, at 139. On March 15, 1974, the
CIA terminated the CHAOS program. Id. The Agency instructed all field offices to turn
over any domestic information received (as a byproduct of foreign investigations) to the
FBI. Id. at 148. The Rockefeller Commission Report made four recommendations
regarding the program. Id. at 150. First, "Presidents should refrain from directing the CIA
to perform what are essentially internal security tasks." Id. Second, "[tihe CIA should resist
any efforts, whatever their origin, to involve it again in such improper activities." Id.
Third, "[t]he Agency should guard against allowing any component (like the Special
Operations Group) to become so self-contained and isolated from top leadership that regular
supervision and review are lost." Id. Finally, "[t]he files of the CHAOS project which have
no foreign intelligence value should be destroyed by the Agency at the conclusion of the
current congressional investigations, or as soon thereafter as permitted by law." Id.
61 See S. REP. No. 94-755, at 3 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT],
available at http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/book3/contents.htm (last
visited Nov. 15, 2004). Two years after the FBI started its COINTELPRO operations, J.
Edgar Hoover wrote a book on overcoming the communist threat. See J. EDGAR HOOVER,
MASTERS OF DECEIT: THE STORY OF COMMUNISM IN AMERICA AND HOW TO FIGHT IT (1958).
Excerpts are available at http://www.icdc.com/-paulwolf/cointelpro/mastersofdeceit.htm
(last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
62 See Murray & Wunsch, supra note 14, at 78. As mentioned in Part II.B supra,
Hoover started amassing these records at the direction of Attorney General A. Mitchell
Palmer.
63 CHURCH COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 61, at 3.
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employer to get a target fired ... to using the IRS to audit a professor,
not just to collect any taxes owed, but to distract him from his political
activities.""
According to the Church Committee - a Senate Select Committee
formed to investigate the activities of the FBI during the mid 1970s -
the Agency conducted 2,700 such COINTELPRO operations.65 "The
unexpressed major premise of the programs was that a law enforcement
agency has the duty to do whatever is necessary to combat perceived
threats to the existing social and political order." 6 The FBI somehow
kept these programs secret for fifteen years.67 However, the Agency
finally terminated all COINTELPRO operations in 1971 due to a "threat
of public exposure. 68
64 Id. at 8. One of Hoover's most famous targets was Dr. Martin Luther King:
The FBI's effort to discredit Dr. King and to undermine the SCLC involved
plans touching on virtually every aspect of Dr. King's life. The FBI scrutinized
Dr. King's tax returns, monitored his financial affairs, and even tried to
establish that he had a secret foreign bank account. Religious leaders and
institutions were contacted in an effort to undermine their support of him, and
unfavorable information was "leaked" to the press. Bureau officials contacted
members of Congress, and special "off the record" testimony was prepared for
the Director's use before the House Appropriations Committee. Efforts were
made to turn White House and Justice Department Officials against Dr. King by
barraging them with unfavorable reports and, according to one witness, even
offering to play for a White House official tape recordings that the Bureau
considered embarrassing to King.
Id at 131.
65 Id. at 8. When the Church Committee was conducting its investigation, the FBI
produced several documents which supported an FBI contention that various Attorneys
General, Presidential advisors, members of the House Appropriations Subcommittee, and
members of the Presidential Cabinet were, at the very least, put on notice of several
COINTELPRO operations. Id. at 11.
66 Id. at 3. The tactics included surveillance and infiltration, dissemination of false
information, creation of group conflict, repeatedly arresting activists to interfere with their
group participation, and participation in assaults and assassinations. See Natsu Taylor
Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of
COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REv. 1051,
1081-88 (2002). For example, the FBI would place agents within certain groups to
advocate violence and illegal activity that, if carried out, could be used to take the group
down. Id. at 1085.
67 CHURCH COMMYIEE REPORT, supra note 61, at 3.
68 Id. On March 8, 1971, someone broke into the FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania,
stealing several documents that included references to the COINTELPRO programs. Id. At
the time, the "COINTELPRO" phrase was unknown outside the Bureau. Whoever took the
documents released them to the press, which prompted reporter Carl Stern to file a Freedom
of Information Act lawsuit to obtain additional information on COINTELPRO activities.
Id. Soon thereafter, the FBI decided to terminate all COINTELPRO operations. Id. at 3
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D. The Red Squads of the 1960s and 70s
While the FBI and CIA monitored the activities of activists,
political leaders, and ordinary citizens across the country, several state
and local police organizations conducted rigorous surveillance programs
on a local level.69 In New York, for example, the Bureau of Special
Services collected intelligence files with more than one million
documents on dissident individuals and groups, including records on the
Mayor of New York City.7" In Chicago, undercover agents from the
city's police department infiltrated community action organizations and
the department's intelligence unit created dossiers on scores of the
city's civic leaders, politicians, and journalists.] When the extent of
these and other organizations' surveillance practices became apparent in
the mid-seventies, churches, political groups, civil liberties
organizations, and individual activists in New York, Chicago, and
Memphis initiated a series of federal civil rights lawsuits in an attempt
to curtail their cities' intelligence programs."
Initially, the police departments in New York and Chicago filed
motions to dismiss, which the courts denied.73 The Memphis Police
n. 1.
69 See Paul G. Chevigny, Politics and Law in the Control of Local Surveillance, 69
CORNELL L. REv. 735 (1984).
70 See David Burnham, City Has Its Own Special Police to Keep Dossiers on
Dissidents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1969, at A30; See also Chevigny, supra note 69, at 749. In
Handschu v. Special Services Division, 349 F. Supp. 766 (S.D. N.Y. 1972) ("Handschu r')
the complaint filed against the New York Police Department also alleged that the
Department used agents to infiltrate political and social organizations. According to the
plaintiffs, the police collected membership lists of lawful organizations and established
reports on individuals based on their membership in these groups. Id. at 769-70.
71 Seth S. King, Police in Chicago Kept Dossiers on Civic Leaders and Newsmen, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1975, at A34. Chicago's undercover agents became active members in
groups like "the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance,... the Rev. Jesse Jackson's People
United to Save Humanity... and the Alliance to End Police Repression, which concerned
itself with cases of alleged police brutality." Id. One undercover agent became so involved
in the group he was monitoring that he was elected president. Id.
72 Chevigny, supra note 69, at 747.
73 See ACLU v. City of Chicago, 431 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Il. 1976); Alliance to End
Repression v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 115 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Handschu I, 349 F. Supp. 766,
767-68 (S.D. N.Y. 1972) (refusing to grant defendant's motion to dismiss). The two actions
in Chicago eventually consolidated into one. In the New York trial, Handschu, the
defendants submitted, in support of their motion to dismiss, an affidavit from the New York
City Police Commissioner defending the practices of the Bureau of Special Services.
Handschu, 349 F. Supp. at 767. The Commissioner stated that "the practices and procedures
followed by [the Bureau of Special Services] in carrying out its intelligence functions
[were] within the scope of the duties imposed by the New York City Charter to protect the
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Department, on the other hand, responded by hastily destroying all of its
intelligence files.74 The Memphis plaintiffs obtained a temporary
restraining order to prevent further file destruction, but Memphis's
Mayor and Chief of Police claimed that they had destroyed the files
before the order was served.75 This claim turned out to be false, as some
of the "destroyed" files later appeared in police department offices
outside the intelligence section.76
As a result of the suits in Chicago, New York, and Memphis, the
City of Los Angeles also started destroying its collection of more than
two million intelligence files.77 As was the case in Memphis, however,
some of the "destroyed" files later reappeared.78 One detective with the
Los Angeles police force even stored some of the files at his home.79
When this and other information related to the scandal came to light, the
Los Angeles City Council passed an ordinance giving the subjects of
the police department's investigations limited access to the intelligence
files.0 Yet, the City Council failed to place controls on future
surveillance practices until "forced to do so by the pressure of
litigation." 81 On the eve of trial, the Council approved a settlement that
gave the plaintiffs $900,000 and placed new restrictions on police
investigations. 2
health, safety, and welfare of the public." id.
74 See Chevigny, supra note 69, at 751-52.
75 Id. at 752.
76 Id. This appears to be a common theme among police departments that decide to
destroy intelligence files. See Files Not for the Taking, DENVER POST, Jan. 10, 2003, at B6.
77 Chevigny, supra note 69, at 768-69. The City also adopted a new set of regulations,
which provided that the intelligence division of the police department could only investigate
groups or individuals that disrupt, or assist in disrupting, the public order. Id. at 769. In
later months, further revelations showed that the intelligence division had been keeping
"files on major and minor politicians, a judge, and the President of the Board of Police
Commissioners, its own oversight body." Id. at 770-71.
78 Id. at 771-72.
79 See id. at 772. A similar event took place in Oregon. Despite Oregon law, a former
Portland terrorism expert carried thirty-six boxes of "spy files" to his barn, where they
stayed until 1987. Files Not for the Taking, supra note 76. Later, the files ended up with a
Portland Tribune columnist. Id.
80 Chevigny, supra note 69, at 773.
81 Id.
82 Id. Los Angeles's consent decree requires the LAPD to have a "reasonable and
articulated suspicion" that a group or individual is planning, threatening, or attempting to
commit a "significant disruption of the public order" before it can initiate an investigation.
Id. (citing the Los Angeles Consent Decree). The decree defines "significant disruption of
the public order" as "unlawful acts which can reasonably be expected to result in death,
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Eventually, Memphis, Chicago, and New York also signed consent
decrees that placed strict limitations on their police departments'
surveillance practices." Generally, the cities agreed to implement
internal annual audits of their police departments, place limitations on
dissemination of material obtained through investigation, and establish
internal bureaucratic review of questionable cases."4 Chicago even
agreed to an external audit once every five years.85
However, both New York and Chicago recently convinced their
respective court systems to modify the cities' consent decrees to grant
their police departments greater investigatory freedom.86 For instance,
the Seventh Circuit agreed that Chicago had a right to restoration of
control over its activities, reasoning that "[t]he era in which the Red
Squad flourished is history, along with the Red Squad itself. The
instabilities of that era have largely disappeared... [and] [t]he culture
that created and nourished the Red Squad has evaporated." 7
Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit's reasoning is flawed.8
Consider, for example, the City of Denver, Colorado. Denver recently
admitted that it too had a Red Squad during the 1960s and 1970s."
serious bodily injury or significant property damage and which are intended to have such
results to further societal objectives, to influence societal action or to harass on the basis of
race, religion or national origin." Id. at 773 n.236 (citing the Los Angeles Consent Decree).
83 See id. at 747-67.
84 Id. at 752-57.
85 Id. at 756-57. For a detailed discussion of the settlement process and the settlement
itself, see Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537 (N.D. I11. 1982)
(approving the Chicago Consent Decree).
86 See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2001);
Handschu v. Special Services Division, 273 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
87 Alliance to End Repression, 237 F.3d at 802. Additionally, the court stated:
If police get wind that a group of people have begun meeting and discussing the
desirability of committing acts of violence in pursuit of an ideological agenda, a
due regard for the public safety counsels allowing the police department to
monitor the statements of the group's members, to build a file, perhaps to plant
an undercover agent.
Id. This is the exact type of rationale that police department's used in the 1950s-70s to
monitor, infiltrate, and harass organizations that the police believed to be communist
sympathizers. Id.
88 See Robert Dreyfuss, The Cops are Watching You, THE NATION, June 3, 2002,
available at http://www.thenation.com/docprint.mhtml?i=20020603&s=dreyfuss. (last
visited Mar. 9, 2004) ("From New York to Chicago, from Florida to California, police
departments are creating, rebuilding or strengthening intelligence units and antiterrorism
squads."). The instabilities of the 1950s-70s that were caused by the communist threat have
reappeared in the twenty-first century because of the ever-present terrorist threat See id.
89 Judith Graham, Denver's Secret Files on Citizens Arouse Outrage: Police Began
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Denver also admitted that it never destroyed the files it collected during
those periods despite originally claiming that they had.9" In fact, the
city's police department not only retained its collection of files on
Colorado citizens, it continued to build that collection over the next
thirty years.91 The department's files grew to cover 3,200 individuals
and 208 organizations.9 2 "Many of those people did nothing more than
attend peaceful protests at the state Capitol or go to meetings of groups
that police decided might represent a threat to public order." 3 Thus, the
instabilities of the Red Squad era have not disappeared and the culture
that nourished the Red Squads remains intact. In fact, as the following
section explains, federal and state governments continue to rely on these
instabilities to justify their recent expansion and maintenance of
surveillance programs that purport to fight terror."4
Ill History Repeats Itsel.f Surveillance Developments During the
"War on Terror"
An understanding of the current war on terror within the context of
United States history is necessary to fully appreciate the significance of
recent government decisions on the "proper balance between national
security and civil rights." 95 The Total Information Awareness program
("TIA") and the Multi-State Antiterrorism Information Exchange
("Matrix") - like the Alien and Sedition Acts, the FBI, the CIA, and the
surveillance forces during the Red Scares before - were created in times
when the United States government believed in the existence of a
Spying in the 50s, CHi. TarB., Jan. 27, 2003, at 7; see also Files Not for the Taking, supra
note 76.
90 Graham, supra note 89; see also Files Not for the Taking, supra note 76. Initially,
the city claimed that it destroyed all such files in 1999 when it transferred its records to
computers. Id. However, in September 2002, six filing cabinets full of old intelligence files
unexplainably appeared. Id. The material in those files dated back to at least the 1980s. Id.
Soon thereafter, Denver officials admitted that the city began spying in the 1950s. Id.
91 See id; see also Files Not for the Taking, supra note 76.
92 Graham, supra note 89.
93 Id. In discussing the recent growth of antiterrorist and intelligence units across the
country, Robert Dreyfuss noted that, "[i]ronically, all this is occurring in the complete
absence of any actual terrorist activity." Dreyfuss, supra note 88. Some of the momentum
for the growth in surveillance units is simply coming from police departments "taking the
opportunity to expand their powers." Id.
94 See Dreyfuss, supra note 88 ("From New York to Chicago, from Florida to
California, police departments are creating, rebuilding or strengthening intelligence units
and antiterrorism squads.").
95 See Cohen, supra note 27, at 1433.
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significant threat to national security. Additionally, the leaders of the
TIA and Matrix programs - like the leaders of the various programs
before - made significant efforts to reassure the public that they will not
use TIA or the Matrix improperly against innocent Americans. 96
However, history shows that such reassurances are unreliable at best.97
Thus, programs like the TIA and the Matrix need additional scrutiny to
protect the public from potential unconstitutional excess.9"
A. Total Information Awareness
As the predecessor to the Matrix, the TIA garnered significant
criticism for its potential threat to individual privacy. Developed by
DARPA's Information Awareness Office - which was under the direct
control of the Pentagon - the TIA was a "sweeping computer
surveillance initiative" designed to collect massive amounts of personal
data on American citizens.99 According to DARPA, however, the
agency did not design the program as a tool for spying on innocent
Americans: "The TIA research and development program aims to
integrate information technologies into a prototype to provide tools to
better detect, classify, and identify potentialforeign terrorists."109
Nevertheless, even if the government did not intend to frighten the
Orwell-reading public, it succeeded in doing so. The TIA surveillance
program collected billions of records on all American citizens,
regardless of whether the government actually suspected them of being
96 See, e.g., STATE OF GEORGIA, OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, MATRIX AND ATIX:
INFORMATION PROGRAMS DEVELOPED IN RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, at 1 (Aug. 1,
2003).
97 See supra Part II.
98 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J.
dissenting) ("Precisely because the need for action against [terrorism] is manifest, the need
for vigilance against unconstitutional excess is great.").
99 Hulse, supra note 4; see also Safire, supra note 5.
100 DARPA REPORT, supra note 4, at 3. The DARPA report stated that the goal of the
TIA program was "to increase the probability that authorized agencies of the United States
can preempt adverse actions." Id. To accomplish this task, the TIA would have used a
controversial technique called data mining. Id. "The core notion behind data mining is that
an automated process like a computer algorithm can sift through trillions of pieces of
information about millions of people and accurately direct the attention of screeners
towards the relative handful who harbor terrorist or other criminal intentions." AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DATA MINING MOVES INTO THE STATES at 4 (2004) [hereinafter
DATA MINING MOVES INTO THE STATES], available at http://www.aclu.org/
Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=14254&c=130 (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
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potential terrorists. °1
Every purchase you make with a credit card, every magazine
subscription you buy and medical prescription you fill, every Web
site you visit and e-mail you send or receive, every academic grade
you receive, every bank deposit you make, every trip you book and
every event you attend - all these transactions and communications
will go into what the Defense Department describes as "a virtual,
centralized grand database."'
10 2
The Pentagon planned to use this information - along with
criminal history records, address histories, driver's license information,
etc. - as part of a large-scale data mining project that would attempt to
predict future terrorist events based on the past habits or actions of
American individuals. 13 Yet, no evidence existed that the program
would even work. 4 Information in such large-scale databases is often
wrong and the error rate could be disgracefully high, which would result
in wrongful accusations against innocent citizens. 5 Additionally, the
potential for government abuse of such a system is extraordinarily high,
and the simple fact that the government has access to such vast amounts
106
of personal data is somewhat Orwellian in nature.
101 Safire, supra note 5.
102 Id. The Office of Information Awareness, as part of the new antiterrorist surveillance
system, also worked on a radar-based device that identifies people by the way they walk.
See Maureen Dowd, Walk This Way: Slouching Towards Orwell, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May
22, 2003, at A19.
103 See Government Data Mining: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology,
Information Policy, and Intergovernmental Relations, 108th Cong. 1-5 (2003) (statement of
Paula B. Dockery, Chairman, Florida Senate Committee on Home Defense, Public Security
and Ports) available at http://reform.house.gov/uploadedfiles/dockery.pdf (last visited Nov.
15, 2004). The system employed decision trees, deviation detection, algorithms, and image
analysis. Id. at 1.
104 See Government Data Mining. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology,
Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census of the House Comm. on
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Barry Steinhardt, Director,
American Civil Liberties Union), available at http://www.aclu.org/
SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12669&c=206 (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
105 See id.; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL
HISTORY RECORD INFORMATION: A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, 2001 UPDATE 38 (Dec. 2001)
(admitting that "inadequacies in the accuracy and completeness of criminal history records
is the single most serious deficiency affecting the Nation's criminal history record
information."); Shared Databases Bore Through Privacy Barriers, MILWAUKEE J. SENT.,
Dec. 30, 2003, at 6E (describing how a sales manager at Hilton Hotels was fired because
Hilton relied on erroneous information in a commercial database that said the employee had
a criminal history).
106 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, How to Protect America, and Your Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
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Even the logo for the Information Awareness Office - "Scientia
Est Potentia," which translates to "Knowledge Is Power" - inspired
comparisons between the TIA and Orwell's 1984."7 Scripted below an
all-seeing eye that was perched atop an Egyptian pyramid, the slogan
sounded eerily similar to Big Brother's party slogan: "War is Peace,
Freedom is Slavery, Ignorance is Strength."' Chosen by the head of
the Information Awareness Office, Admiral John Poindexter - who was
convicted after the Iran-Contra affair on five felony counts of lying in
Congressional testimony, destroying official documents, and
obstructing a congressional inquiry - the program's slogan confirmed
Poindexter's complete lack of political awareness."'
In an attempt to dispel some of the fears over the TIA program,
and to salvage his position as head of the Information Awareness office,
Poindexter eliminated the panoptic eye and pyramid from TIA's logo
and changed the program's name from Total Information Awareness to
Terrorist Information Awareness."' However, this slight change in
style did nothing to quell the public's suspicions over the program's
substance. In fact, some of these suspicions were confirmed when
Congress learned that Poindexter created a TIA website where investors
could bet on the likelihood of future terrorist attacks."'
Dubbed the Policy Analysis Market, the site would have rewarded
traders that correctly forecasted terrorist attacks, assassinations, and
political coups.' "Traders bullish on a biological attack on Israel or
6, 2004, at A27 ("In its current form, the system poses a significant danger that
unscrupulous state officials will conduct dragnets in search of crimes that have nothing to
do with terrorism.") For a recent example of how government employees mishandled and
improperly disclosed personal information, see DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE,
REPORT TO THE PUBLIC ON EVENTS SURROUNDING JETBLUE DATA TRANSFER (Feb. 20, 2004)
(discussing the Transportation and Safety Administration's improper role in obtaining
passenger data from jetBlue Airlines and ensuring that jetBlue transferred the information to
a private corporation).
107 See Total Information Awareness, supra note 8.
108 ORWELL, supra note 1, at 4.
109 Total Information Awareness, supra note 8. An appeals court overturned
Poindexter's conviction because Congress granted Poindexter immunity for his testimony.
See Safire, supra note 5.
110 See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Pentagon Details New Surveillance System: Critics Fear
Proposed Extensive Use of Computer Database Raises Privacy Issues, WASH. POST, May
21, 2003, at A06. For a comparison of the old and new logos of the Information Awareness
Office, see the ACLU's Total Information Awareness page at
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=14729&c=1 30 (last visited Feb. 21, 2004).
111 See Hulse, supra note 4.
112 Id.
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bearish on the chances of a North Korean missile strike" would have
had the opportunity to wager on the likelihood of such an event.' In
defense of the program, the Defense Department blandly stated:
"Research indicates that markets are extremely efficient, effective and
timely aggregators of dispersed and even hidden information."' 4 What
the Defense Department did not mention, however, was the potential for
market manipulation by the terrorists that would be carrying out the
events."5 Since all traders would have traded with complete anonymity,
terrorists could have participated in the trading and profited from their
terrorist activities."
16
The congressional furor surrounding the Policy Analysis Market
added momentum to an effort to completely eliminate funding for the
Office of Information Awareness." The uproar also convinced
Poindexter to resign from government service." However, it did not
prevent other government agencies from attempting to create programs
that are substantially similar to the TIA." 9
B. Multi-State Antiterrorism Information Exchange
In 2003, Florida announced that it was partnering with a private
corporation, Seislnt, Inc., to develop the Matrix. 12' According to the
'13 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 See Hulse, supra note 4. The Web site for the Policy Analysis Market still exists at
http://www.policyanalysismarket.org. However, no information is currently available
through the site as of Nov. 15, 2004. After Congress learned about the program, the White
House, which had allocated eight million dollars to fund the site through 2005, ordered the
Office of Information Awareness to alter the site so that market events that were visible
earlier in the day could no longer be seen. Id.
117 Id. Senator Ron Wyden sponsored a bill in February of 2003 that temporarily cut-off
funds for the TIA program. Id. The bill stated that no agency of the government could
appropriate funds to the program for 90 days, during which time the Department of Defense
had to issue a detailed report on the TIA program. See H.R. Res. 2, 108th Cong. (2003); see
also Cha, supra note 110. The Defense Department issued the report, but Congress
eliminated funding for the program anyway after learning about the Policy Analysis
Market. See DARPA REPORT, supra note 4, at 3; Hulse, supra note 4.
118 Eric Schmitt, Poindexter Will Be Quitting Over Terrorism Betting Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2003, at A11.
119 See O'Harrow, supra note 1.
120 Id. In Florida's 2003 Annual Report on Domestic Security, the state's Domestic
Security Oversight Board stated that one of the foundations of Florida's security strategy
was to "Improve Information Intelligence and Technology." FLORIDA'S DOMESTIC
SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, USING STATE AND FEDERAL FUNDS TO
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Georgia Office of Homeland Security, "Matrix is an informational
program developed to increase and enhance the exchange of sensitive
terrorism and other criminal activit information between local, state,
and federal enforcement agencies. However, even though developers
of the Matrix ostensibly set up the program to allow law enforcement
officials to fight crime and terrorism, data on law-abiding citizens
constitutes the majority of the information in the database.122 In fact, the
program is "designed to ... analyze billions of records about both
criminals and ordinary Americans.""'
The records in the Matrix program come from a mix of
government and commercial databases.' However, Matrix officials
have not released a complete list of the information actually contained
within the system. Nevertheless, Matrix officials have admitted that
they use the following data, which is available from public databases:
• Credit information
* Driver's license photographs
* Marriage and divorce records
* Past addresses and telephone numbers
" Names and addresses of family members
* Neighbors' addresses and telephone numbers
" Business associates
* The make, model and color of registered vehicles
* Speeding tickets
" Arrests
* Social security numbers and dates of birth..
" Bankruptcies
* Liens and judgments
" UCC filings
* Concealed weapons permits
" FAA aircraft and pilots licenses
* Hunting and fishing licenses
MAKE FLORIDA SAFER 1 (Sept. 2003).
121 STATE OF GEORGIA, supra note 96, at 1 (Aug. 1, 2003).
122 Gast, supra note 9, at F1 (citing statement of Gerald M. Haskins, Professor of
Computer and Information Science and Engineering, University of Florida).
123 O'Harrow, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
124 DATA MINING MOVES INTO THE STATES, supra note 100, at 1.
125 Id. at 1-2.
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0 Professional licenses
0 Voter registration records "'26
This is a fairly comprehensive list of personal information that is
publicly available on private individuals. Yet, it does not include all of
the information that may be available through the Matrix's admitted use
of commercial databases. "Given the information available in today's
commercial databases ... the range of detail accessible through the
program could well be even greater, extending into such areas as
purchasing habits, magazine subscriptions, demographic information,
categorizaons.' The records available in commercial
databases may even include student loan status, prescription lists,
118
abortion records, and political and religious affiliations.
Oscar Gandy described the technology that collects and processes
this information as the "panoptic sort.' ' 29 Essentially, the panoptic sort
collects information on the everyday lives of individuals and then
categorizes those individuals based on their social, political, and
consumer preferences.' The Matrix employs a technique called "data
mining" that is based on this same categorization principle."' "The core
notion behind data mining is that an automated process like a computer
algorithm can sift through trillions of pieces of information about
millions of people and accurately direct the attention of screeners
towards the relative handful who harbor terrorist or other criminal
126 Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et al. at 12-13,
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, 124 S. Ct. 430 (2003)
(No. 03-5554) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center].
127 DATA MINING MOVES INTO THE STATES, supra note 100, at 2.
128 SYKES, supra note 2, at 29. Acxiom, owner of one of the world's largest commercial
databases of consumer information, holds detailed records on nearly every United States
citizen. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1473-74
(2000); see also Acxiom, Core Competencies, Database,
http://www.acxiom.com/default.aspx?ID=1768&CountryCode=USA (last visited Nov. 15,
2004) ("Acxiom creates and manages some of the largest databases in the world."). The
government is increasingly collecting information from private entities to develop databases
of personal information. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1095 (2002). For example, ChoicePoint has
contracts with approximately thirty-five federal agencies, including the FBI and IRS. Id.
The company's database holds over ten billion records, which were gathered from sources
that include private detectives and credit reporting agencies. Id.
129 OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT, A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION 15 (1993).
130 See id., at 15. The three functions of the panoptic sort, according to Gandy, are:
identification, classification, and assessment. Id.
131 See DATA MINING MOVES INTO THE STATES, supra note 100, at 4.
2004]
SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL
intentions.' 32
Defenders of the Matrix deny that it is a data mining program and
assert that the system simply "includes information that has always been
available to investigators but brings it together and enables police to
access it with extraordinary speed."'' This is incorrect on at least three
counts. First, law enforcement officers have never had routine access to
the commercial data available in the Matrix.'-" Second, in the Institute
for Intergovernmental Research's application for a four million dollar
Justice Department grant to fund the Matrix system, the Institute listed
that one of the objectives of the Matrix was to "develop and pilot test a
model data mining and integration system for terrorist and other
intelligence information."'35 Finally, creating a program that combines
isolated, independently available databases of information on innocent
American citizens is not simply a "technological advancement;" it is a
significant setback to the basic American principle that the government
will let people alone unless it has cause to suspect them of
wrongdoing.
Even those closely associated with the Matrix freely admit to the
potential intrusiveness of the data mining system. "It's scary. It could
be abused. I mean, I can call up everything about you, your pictures
and pictures of your neighbors," stated Phil Ramer, special agent in
charge of Florida's statewide intelligence.'37 Data mining is a powerful
tool. Indeed, the fact that the TIA employed data mining was one of the
reasons that Congress eliminated funding for the TIA program. Now,
132 Id.
133 O'Harrow, supra note 8.
134 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Matrix: Myths and Reality 2 (Feb. 10, 2004)
[hereinafter MYTHS AND REALITY], available at
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=14894&c=130 (last visited March 5, 2004).
135 Id. (citing INSTITUTE FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, AN APPLICATION TO
PROVIDE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING SUPPORT TO THE
MULTISTATE PILOT PROJECT TO EXCHANGE TERRORISM AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION). Additionally, "documents obtained by the ACLU [through several Freedom
of Information Act requests] contain numerous explicit references to data mining, including
meeting minutes of the Matrix board, presentations by the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement, and in FDLE budget documents." Id.
136 DATA MINING MOVES INTO THE STATES, supra note 100, at 3.
137 O'Harrow, supra note 1.
138 See Hulse, supra note 4. Congress has proactively passed a few other privacy
protecting measures as well. For example, the Communications Privacy Act of 1984
prohibits cable operators from monitoring subscribers' viewing habits. See 47 U.S.C. §
551 (2002). Also, the Video Privacy Protection Act prohibits the release of video rental
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however, the executive branch of the federal government is attempting
to avoid Congress's elimination of federal data minin programs by
establishing the same systems through state cooperation. In 2003, the
Justice Department and the Department of Homeland Security pledged
$12 million to the State of Florida to set up the Matrix system. Thus,
thwarted by Congress in its attempt to create the TIA, the Bush
Administration now encourages states to pick up where the TIA left
off.141
Thirteen states originally pledged to participate in this endeavor.
42
Yet, eight of those states have since dropped out.143 However, while
only Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Connecticut remain,
these states represent a considerable percentage of the United States
population.' 44  Moreover, several other states are still considering
membership in the Matrix program. 5  Thus, the Matrix continues to
data. See Communications Privacy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000); Video Privacy
Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).
139 See DATA MINING MOVES INTO THE STATES, supra note 100, at 4; O'Harrow, supra
note 1.
140 O'Harrow, supra note 1.
141 See id.
142 DATA MINING MOVES INTO THE STATES, supra note 100, at 4. California and Texas
showed an interest but backed out before signing the June 2003 agreement. Id.
143 Mark Johnson, 2 More States Pull Out of Anti-Crime Database, New York and
Wisconsin Withdrew from the Controversial Matrix Program, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 12,
2004, at A12; Mark Johnson, 2 More States Turn Against Massive Anticrime Database,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at A30. The states that have either dropped out or declined to
participate include: Alabama, California, Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, Kentucky, New
York, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
144 Johnson, supra note 143. Ohio and Connecticut, however, are also having second
thoughts. In Connecticut, for example, lawmakers in the state recently scheduled hearings
to determine whether the program's usefulness outweighs privacy concerns. See Lisa
Chedekel, Legislators Wary of Matrix System, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 4, 2004, at B9. In
Ohio, the Governor has decided to review the State's involvement. See Jon Craig, State
Sold Ohioan's Driving Records to Florida Database, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, March 14,
2004, at 4C. Ohio first sold the driver records to the Matrix in October, 2002. Id.
However, state officials did not release this information until nearly two years later when
questioned about their participation in the program. See Bill Bush, Ohio May Join in
Multistate Database: Some Say Anti-Terrorism Program Too Intrusive, Backers Tout its
Reach, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 25, 2003, at AO1 ("Ohio is considering providing Matrix
with driver and motor-vehicle registrations .. ") (emphasis added).
145 See Jon Chesto, Pol Wants State Cops to Join Info Database, BOSTON HERALD, Feb.
24, 2004, at 032 (discussing Massachusetts's potential membership in the Matrix); Decision
on 'Matrix' Database Postponed, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Feb. 4, 2004, at B6 (discussing
Tennessee's possible membership in the Matrix system); Entering the Matrix: Iowans
Deserve Full Public Debate on New Database, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Feb. 11, 2004, at
20041
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present a significant threat to individual privacy and the need to
scrutinize the program remains.
IV. Restoring Privacy after the Matrix
That the individual shall have full protection in person and in
property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been
found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature
and extent of such protection. Political, social, and economic
changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in
its eternal youth, grows to meet the new demands of society. 146
The existing legal framework surrounding informational privacy is
failing, as programs like the Matrix render old laws obsolete.47 In an
effort to address this problem, the remainder of this Article discusses
two ways to challenge the repressive potential of the Matrix system: (1)
seeking an injunction against the operation of the Matrix program under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution,'48 and (2) lobbying for state legislative action in the form
of consent decrees that either (a) place strict limitations on the
program's operations, or (b) eliminate funding for the program
entirely. 49 None of these options are perfect and, for various reasons,
none may work. The most likely option for short-term success,
however, comes from the legislative approach. 5°
B8 (discussing Iowa's possible membership in the Matrix).
146 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 11, at 193.
147 See DeVries, supra note 27, at 306 ("The changes wrought by digital technology...
are so deep and broad that the old laws and theories are not adapting fast enough. New,
privacy invasive technological practices may solidify into new social norms, and future
generations will not know to challenge them.").
148 In addition to the problems discussed later in this section, Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity places some limitations on the effectiveness of litigation against the
Matrix. Since SeisInt is Florida's partner in developing the Matrix, and receives its funding
from the State, it might be considered an "arm of the state" and receive Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity protections. For a detailed discussion of the Eleventh
Amendment and its effects on litigation against states or state officials, see Scott Dodson,
The Metes and Bounds of State Sovereign Immunity, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 721 (2002);
Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485 (2001). In
short, the best way to avoid Eleventh Amendment obstacles is to sue, in his or her
individual capacity, the state and Matrix officials that are in charge of the operating the
Matrix system. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 169 (1908). For a discussion on how
the Fourth Amendment protections are implicated by the collection and compilation of
personal information, see Solove, supra note 128.
149 See infra Part IV.C.
150 See id.
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A. Protecting the First Amendment Right to Free Association
1. Surveillance under Laird v. Tatum
The First Amendment preserves the government's right to collect
publicly available information.' However, the First Amendment also
protects each citizen's right to belong to lawful social or political
associations.'52 Consequently, the government cannot collect publicly
available information in a manner that objectively "chills" a citizen's
right to free association.'53 Yet, what constitutes an objective chill is
open for debate.'54
In Laird v. Tatum, the Supreme Court refused, in a 5-4 decision, to
enjoin the United States Army from establishing a database containing
records on civilian political activists."' In 1967, President Johnson
ordered Army troops to Detroit, Michigan, to assist local authorities in
deterring potential civil unrest.'56 Once there, soldiers attended public
meetings, researched general publications, and obtained information
from civilian law enforcement agencies in an effort to monitor political
dissidents.'57 Army officials then forwarded all information collected
151 See Froomkin, supra note 128, at 1508 ("The First Amendment protects the freedom
of speech and of the press, but does not explicitly mention the right to gather information.
However, both the Supreme Court and appellate courts have interpreted the First
Amendment to encompass a right to gather information.").
152 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958); see also Elrod v. Bums, 427
U.S. 347, 356-60 (1976).
153 See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11-15 (1972); see also Socialist Workers Party v.
Attorney General, 419 U.S. 1314 (1974) (surveillance that deters supporters from joining an
organization, even if surveillance is in public, does present a case or controversy under
Article III).
154 Compare Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc'y of Friends v. Tate, 519
F.2d 1335, 1337-38 (3d Cir. 1975) (following Laird and stating that police surveillance of
public meetings, by itself, was "legally unobjectionable"), with Presbyterian Church v.
United States, 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that active surveillance of church
services, which resulted in decreased attendance, created an objective harm for purposes of
Article III's case or controversy requirement).
155 Laird, 408 U.S. at 1. A total of four justices dissented in two separate opinions.
Arguing for the right to be free from overbearing surveillance, Justice Douglas stated:
When an intelligence officer looks over every nonconformist's shoulder in the
library, or walks invisibly by his side in a picket line, or infiltrates his club, the
America once extolled as the voice of liberty heard around the world no longer
is cast in the image which Jefferson and Madison designed ....
Id. at 28-29 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 4-5.
157 Id. at 6.
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through this surveillance to Army Intelligence Headquarters in Fort
Holabird, Maryland, where officials stored the information in a central
database.'
According to the plaintiffs in Laird, the compilation and storage of
this information effectively prohibited them from freely exercising their
First Amendment rights.5 9 However, the Supreme Court found that the
Army had a right to collect these records, as the simple "existence and
operation of the intelligence gathering and distributing system" did not
establish a "specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future
harm.""6  According to the Court, the plaintiffs' claims were less
significant than other activities that it had previously condemned on
First Amendment grounds, so the Court classified the plaintiffs' injuries
as purely subjective.'' Thus, the plaintiffs' claim did not meet the case
158 Id. at 13-14. When Congress learned about the scope of the Army's surveillance
practices, it convened hearings to express its concerns. Id. at 7. Afterwards, the Army
ordered a significant reduction in the scope of its program. "For example... the records in
the computer data bank at Fort Holabird were found unnecessary and were destroyed, along
with other related records." Laird, 408 U.S. at 13-14.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 3, 14. According to the majority, "[a]llegations of a subjective 'chill' are not
an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific
future harm." Id. at 13-14. In reaching this decision, the majority stated that "it is
significant that the principal sources of information were the news media and publications
in general circulation." Id. at 6. The dissent, of course, disagreed with the majority's
position that no objective harm exsisted, stating that "the present controversy is not a
remote, imaginary conflict." Id. at 26 (Douglas, J. dissenting). The plaintiff's fear was that
"permanent reports of their activities will be maintained in the Army's databank, and their
'profiles' will appear in the so-called 'Blacklist' and that all of this information will be
released to numerous federal and state agencies upon request." Id. at 25 (Douglas, J.
dissenting). "One need not wait to sue until he loses his job or until his reputation is
defamed." Laird, 408 U.S. at 26 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
161 See id. at 11-14. The Laird Court cited a number of cases protecting freedom of
association: Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (holding that a state may not
require persons to disclose their associations in order to receive admission to the state bar);
see also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (holding that a state cannot fire
employees merely because of their political associations); Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301 (1965) (holding that a state cannot require persons to send individual written
requests to the Post Office in order to receive mailings of certain types of political
literature); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (holding that a state could not require
persons to take an oath of vague and uncertain meaning as a condition of employment).
According to the Court in Laird, these decisions recognize that "governmental action may
be subject to constitutional challenge even though it has only an indirect effect on the
exercise of First Amendment rights." Laird, 408 U.S. at 12-13. However, the Court also
stated that these decisions in no way eroded the "established principle that to entitle a
private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or
legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
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or controversy requirement of Article III.'
2. Establishing Article III Standing
Since Laird, lower courts have struggled to determine when a
surveillance system creates an objective harm for purposes of Article III
standing.163 As Laird suggested, when the surveillance only involves
police attendance at meetings that are open to the public, a court is
unlikely to find that objective harm is involved."' On the other hand,
when police surveillance has specific adverse effects on an individual,
or group of individuals, the First Amendment claim is justiciable,6 ' even
if the surveillance is purely in the public realm. 166 Thus, to establish
sustaining, a direct injury as the result of that action .... Id. at 13 (quoting Ex Parte
Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)).
162 See id. at 14 ("[T]he federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the
Constitution do not render advisory opinions.") (quoting United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947)).
163 See, e.g., Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 627 F. Supp. 1044, 1048
(N.D. Ill. 1985).
164 See Laird, 408 U.S. at 6; see also Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc'y of
Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d 1335, 1337-38 (3d Cir. 1975) (following Laird and stating that
police surveillance of public meetings, by itself, was "legally unobjectionable.").
165 See Alliance to End Repression, 627 F. Supp. at 1048-49 (N.D. 111. 1985); see also
Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that a government
surveillance operation aimed at two individuals that was initiated in response to one of those
individuals filing a discrimination suit against the police department constituted a "specific
present harm"); Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
that active surveillance of church services, which resulted in decreased attendance, created
an objective harm for purposes of Article III case or controversy requirement); Ozonoff v.
Berzak, 744 F.2d 224 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that government "loyalty check" that was
required of applicants to the World Health Organization prevented free exercise of First
Amendment rights); Clark v. Lib. of Cong., 750 F.2d 89 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that a
library worker who was investigated by the FBI because of political associations met case
or controversy requirement of Article III when he alleged that the investigation harmed his
reputation and cost him employment opportunities); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d
Cir. 1975) (holding that FBI plan - in conjunction with the United States Post Office - to
track written communications with the Socialist Workers Party in New York City
constituted a specific harm since the files created as a result of this plan caused injury to
future educational and employment opportunities).
166 See Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 419 U.S. 1314 (1974) (surveillance
that deters supporters from joining an organization, even if surveillance is in public, does
present a case or controversy under Article III). Id. Even if the surveillance program only
monitors public activities or information, the plaintiff can still meet Article IIl's case or
controversy requirement in order to argue the case on its merits. Id. In Socialist Workers
Party, the plaintiffs alleged that the FBI planned to attend and monitor the SWP's upcoming
convention. Id. Justice Marshall found that the plaintiffs' allegations were specific enough,
under Laird, to meet Article III's case or controversy requirement. Id However, Justice
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Article III standing, plaintiffs must show some specific adverse effect. 167
According to Laird, plaintiffs can make this showing by proving either:
(1) that a surveillance system creates a "specific present objective
harm," or (2). that the surveillance creates a "threat of specific future
harm. 168
For the first ten years following Laird, establishing a present
objective harm was fairly straightforward. For example, alleging that
an investigation disrupted a political association by deterring supporters
from joining the group would present a justiciable claim. 69
Alternatively, showing that the dissemination of false or misleading
investigative reports harmed the plaintiff's reputation would suffice to
satisfy Article III standing requirements.'78 However, after the United
States Supreme Court's 1983 decision in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,7'
showing only a present or past objective harm is not enough to establish
justiciability."' Plaintiffs must additionally allege that the government's
violation of First Amendment rights will repeat itself in the future.'73
Marshall went on to state that the plaintiffs did not have a compelling case on the merits.
Id. at 1319; see also Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D. D.C. 1976).
The court in Berlin Democratic Club summarized the requirements for finding a justiciable
claim by stating:
[W]hile collection and retention of information, if collected in a legal manner,
cannot be challenged, public dissemination of that information in a false or
defamatory manner and with no lawful purpose, disruption of legitimate
activities, termination of employment, illegal electronic surveillance, and other
forms of harassment are subject to challenge as beyond 'legitimate surveillance
activities.'
Id. at 151.
167 See supra note 165.
168 See supra note 160.
169 See Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 521-22 (holding that active surveillance of
church services, which resulted in decreased attendance, created an objective harm for
purposes of Article III case or controversy requirement); Founding Church of Scientology
v. FBI, 459 F. Supp. 748, 760 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that surveillance of church activities
presented a justiciable claim because it deterred others from joining the church).
170 See Berlin Democratic Club, 410 F. Supp. at 151 (finding a justiciable claim where
plaintiffs made sufficient allegations that an Army surveillance project went beyond simple
collection and retention of information to disseminating that information with a defamatory
purpose); Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (holding that allegations of
the FBI's dissemination of false and misleading reports to other federal agencies presented a
justiciable claim), vacated in part on other grounds by Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272 (6th
Cir. 1982).
171 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
172 See id
173 See id. In Lyons, the plaintiff was seeking an injunction against the Los Angeles
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Yet, Lyons should not affect standing under the "threat of specific future
harm" test for showing an objective harm because, if proven, a threat of
specific future harm, by definition, has the potential to take place at
some point in the future, thereby satisfying the Lyons standing
requirement.
In Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, the Supreme Court
had to decide whether the FBI's plan to attend and monitor a meeting of
the Young Socialist Alliance ("YSA") would constitute a threat of
future specific harm under Laird v. Tatum.'74 After rejecting the
government's contention that surveillance must be regulatory,
proscriptive, or compulsory before the Court could grant standing,
Justice Marshall found that the plaintiffs' allegations were sufficiently
specific to establish a case or controversy under Article IlI. '5 "[T]he
applicants have complained that the challenged investigative activity
will have the concrete effects of dissuading some YSA delegates from
participating actively in the convention and leading to possible loss of
employment for those who are identified as being in attendance.' 76
Subsequent lower court cases adopted "potential injury to future
employment" as a factor in determining justiciability. 177 In Paton v. La
Prade, for example, the Third Circuit held that the FBI's retention of
files on all persons who wrote letters to the Socialist Workers Party
("SWP") had the potential to interfere with future employment or
Police Department ("LAPD") to prevent its officers from using chokeholds, except in
situations where the person being apprehended threatened the use of deadly force. Id. The
plaintiff alleged that he was stopped by LAPD officers for a routine traffic violation and,
even though he offered no resistance, the officers seized him and applied a chokehold,
which rendered him unconscious and damaged his larynx. Id. at 97. The Supreme Court
held that Lyons did not have standing to bring suit for injunctive relief because "[p]ast
exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding
injunctive relief... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." Id. at 95
(citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)).
174 See Socialist Workers Party, 419 U.S. at 1317-18.
175 Id. at 1318. The government was relying on a passage from Laird which discussed
previous cases where the Court found that state actions violated the First Amendment. "[J1n
each of these cases, the challenged exercise of governmental power was regulatory,
proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the complainant was either presently or
prospectively subject to the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that he was
challenging." Id. (quoting Laird, 408 U.S. at 11). Justice Marshall stated that the
government read Laird too broadly. "In the passage relied upon by the Government, the
Court was merely distinguishing earlier cases, not setting out a rule for determining whether
an action is justiciable or not." Socialist Workers Party, 419 U.S. at 1318.
176 Id. at 1319.
177 See, e.g., Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975).
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educational opportunities, thus establishing a "threat of specific future
harm" and meeting Laird's standing requirements.178 La Prade involved
FBI surveillance of Lori Paton, a high school student enrolled in a social
studies class that "examined the contemporary political spectrum. 1 79 As
part of an assignment for the class, Paton wrote a letter to the Socialist
Workers Party requesting information about the organization.8 ° When
the letter arrived at the post office in New York, the mail delivery
foreman recorded Ms. Paton's name and address from the exterior of
the letter and then forwarded the recorded information to the FBI's New
York branch.''
After receiving Paton's information, the FBI agent assigned to the
investigation contacted the chief of police where Paton lived to ask
whether Ms. Paton had ever been arrested.' 2 Unsatisfied that the
answer was no, the FBI agent then proceeded to interview Ms. Paton's
principal and vice-principal, who informed the agent about the nature of
Paton's homework assignment." 3 Finally content that Ms. Paton was
not involved in subversive activities, the agent recommended that the
FBI administratively close the case.' However, the FBI created a
permanent record of the investigation and placed Paton's name in the
local FBI file index, which it labeled with the symbol "SM-SWP"
(Subversive Matter-Socialist Workers Party).8 5
Paton claimed that the FBI's retention of such a file threatened her
future educational and employment opportunities and the Third Circuit
agreed, holding that "the threatened injury gives Paton standing to
challenge retention of the file."'86 Accordingly, the allegation that a
178 524 F.2d 862, 868 (3d Cir. 1975).
179 Id. at 865.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. If an investigation of an individual has the effect of deterring others from
associating with that individual, that weighs in favor of justiciability. See Jabara, 476 F.
Supp. 561, 568 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
183 Paton, 524 F.2d at 866.
184 Id.
185 Id. Disseminating information collected in a false or misleading manner is also a
factor in favor of justiciability. See Jabara, 476 F. Supp. at 568.
186 Paton, 524 F.2d at 868. The Third Circuit did not rule on the merits of Paton's case.
It did, however, list several factors to consider in determining whether a surveillance
program creates an objective chill:
Factors to be weighed in balancing are the accuracy and adverse nature of
the information, the availability and scope of dissemination of the records,
the legality of the methods by which the information was compiled, the
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surveillance system threatened future educational or employment
opportunities qualified as a "threat of specific future harm" for purposes
of establishing justiciability' 87
Thus, in summary, Laird v. Tatum held that plaintiffs challenging a
surveillance system have to show either a current or past objective
harm, or a threat of specific future harm in order to have standing to
sue. Allegations of a subjective chill are not sufficient to make a claim
justiciable"88 Additionally, after City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, simply
showing a present or past objective harm by itself is not enough to
establish justiciability.'89  Plaintiffs must now allege that the
government's violation of First Amendment rights will repeat itself in
the future.'9" Finally, Socialist Workers Party and cases like Paton v. La
Prade clarified Laird by holding that injury to future educational or
employment opportunities should qualify as a "threat of specific future
harm." 91
3. Does the Matrix Create an Objective Chill?
In holding that the Army's surveillance database did not create an
objective harm, Laird stated that "it is significant that the principal
sources of information were the news media and publications in general
circulation.' 92 In this regard, Matrix officials claim that the system only
collects information that is publicly available.' 93 If true, Laird could
possibly bar any First Amendment claim against Florida's use of the
system. 194  However, there are two reasons why any "public
information" argument should not preclude Article III standing in a
claim against the Matrix program.
existence of statutes authorizing the compilation and maintenance, and
prohibiting the destruction, of the records, and the value of the records to
the Government.
Id. at 869.
187 See id
188 See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
189 See 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
190 See id.
191 See Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 419 U.S. 1314 (1974) (surveillance
that threatens employment opportunities does present a case or controversy under Article
III); Paton, 524 F.2d at 865-68 (surveillance that potentially injures future educational or
employment opportunities presents a justiciable claim).
192 Laird, 408 U.S. at 6.
193 See O'Harrow, supra note 1; Gast, supra note 9.
194 See Laird, 408 U.S. at 6.
2004]
SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL
First, the type of information collected by the Matrix is entirely
different from what the Army collected in Laird. In Laird, the Army's
main sources of information were readily available news publications."5
The Matrix, on the other hand, relies on information that is far more
personal and not so easily obtainable. It contains social security
numbers, dates of birth, driver's license photographs, voter registration
records, and untold information from the Matrix's admitted use of
commercial databases."' Law enforcement officials have never had
routine access to the commercial data available in the Matrix.'97
Second, even if a court decides that the information collected by
the Matrix is publicly available under Laird, that is only one factor the
court must use in determining whether a claim against the Matrix is
justiciable. The court would still have to decide whether the State's use
of the information it collects prevents an individual or group of
individuals from exercising their First Amendment rights.'98
Unfortunately, no one knows exactly what Matrix officials do with
the information they collect.'99 Thus, it is difficult to determine whether
the state participants use information stored in the Matrix in a manner
that objectively harms anyone's exercise of First Amendment rights.
Accordingly, the Laird / City of Los Angeles v. Lyons standing
requirement poses a serious obstacle to challenging the State's use of
the Matrix program on First Amendment grounds. While the collection
of such personal information intuitively seems objectionable, the
collection by itself is not enough to establish a First Amendment
violation.2 0 One must show a specific objective harm committed by the
State, that the State will repeat in the future, or a "specific threat of
195 Id.
196 See DATA MINING MOVES INTO THE STATES, supra note 100, at 1-2; Brief of Amici
Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note 126, at 12-13. "Given the
information available in today's commercial databases... the range of detail accessible
through the program could well be even greater, extending into such areas as purchasing
habits, magazine subscriptions, demographic information, and lifestyle categorizations."
DATA MINING MOVES INTO THE STATES, supra note 100, at 2.
197 MYTHS AND REALITY, supra note 134, at 2.
198 See Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 419 U.S. 1314 (1974) (surveillance
that deters supporters from joining an organization, even if surveillance is in public, does
present a case or controversy under Article III).
199 For example, if a law student buys a subscription to Harper's or Mother Jones, does
someone from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement contact the Dean of the law
school to ask if the student has subversive tendencies? For a similar situation, see Paton,
524 F.2d at 868.
200 See Laird, 408 U.S. at 1.
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future harm" in order to establish a justiciable claim."' Without
knowing how the State uses information in the Matrix system, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to meet these requirements.
B. Selective Disclosure: Exploring the Fourteenth Amendment's
General Right to Privacy
While the First Amendment embodies a specific form of privacy
interest, the right to privacy in one's associations, the Fourteenth
Amendment contains the Constitution's general right to privacy."'
Largely developed by the Warren and Burger Courts during the 1960s
and 1970s, this Fourteenth Amendment protection focuses on an
individual's "right to be let alone.""2 3
Generally, the Supreme Court has characterized this right as
dealing with "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, and child-rearing and education. '' 204 However, at
least two cases suggest a rather significant exception to this general
rule.2"5 In Whalen v. Roe 06 and Nixon v. Administrator of General
201 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Laird, 408 U.S. at 13-14
(1972).
202 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.23
(1977). For a detailed explanation of the development of the right of privacy under the
United States Constitution, see Gerald B. Cope, Jr., Note, Toward a Right of Privacy as a
Matter of State ConstitutionalLaw, 5. FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 631, 659-81 (1977). To establish
a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must pass the three-part
balancing test developed by the Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976).
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335. Essentially, this would require plaintiffs challenging the Matrix to weigh
their privacy interests against: (1) the risk that the Matrix will erroneously invade that
privacy, and (2) the government's efficiency interest in maintaining the Matrix
database. Id.
203 The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). See SYKES, supra note 2, at 91-
92; Cope, supra note 202, at 646-47. While the Court did not fully develop its privacy
doctrine until the middle of the Twentieth Century, the phrase "right to be let alone"
originated from Thomas Cooley's work in the late 1800s, and was popularized by Justices
Warren and Brandeis in their article. Id.
204 See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.26
(1977).
205 Cope, supra note 202, at 670.
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Services,1" the Court strongly implied that the Constitution protects the
right to informational privacy.08 While neither of these cases actually
upheld the privacy right asserted, both recognized the need to protect
individuals from the disclosure of personal information."9
1. Databanks and Information Privacy under Whalen v. Roe
Whalen involved a constitutional challenge to a New York statute
that regulated the use of prescription drugs. In 1972, based on a
concern "that drugs were being diverted into unlawful channels," the
New York Legislature passed a statute that required the State to record
dangerous drug prescriptions in a state-run database."' Under the
statute, doctors could only prescribe certain potentially harmful drugs
by filling out an official form and filing that form with the State Health
Department."' Officials at the Health Department then recorded the
information on tapes for storage in a local database, where each record
remained for five years before being destroyed."3
A few days before the New York statute became effective, a group
of patients and doctors challenged the legislation as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's general right to privacy.214 According to the
plaintiffs, a genuine risk existed that the information in the database
would become public and that publicity of this information would
215
adversely affect the patients' reputations. Consequently, this concern
caused some patients to refrain from taking, and prompted some doctors
206 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
207 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
208 Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging
Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. UNIV. L. REv.
479, 497 (1990).
.209 Id. at 498; Cope, supra note 202, at 680.
210 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
211 Id. at 589. The statute classified drugs in five schedules. Id. Illegal drugs that have
no prescribed medical value and are subject to abuse - such as heroin - were classified as
Schedule I. Id. Schedules II through V include drugs that have a progressively lower
chance for abuse but also have a recognized medical value. Id. The drugs at issue in
Whalen were Schedule II, the most dangerous of the legitimate drugs. Id.
212 Id. at 593. The form included the name of the prescribing physician, the name of the
dispensing facility, the name and dosage of the drug, and the patient's name, address, and
age. Id.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 595-600. The group included patients that used Schedule II drugs, the doctors
that prescribed them, and two associations of physicians. Id.
215 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 595-600.
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to stop prescribing, certain types of medication.2 6 These factors,
according to the plaintiffs, impaired their "interest in the nondisclosure
of private information and also their interest in making important
decisions independently. 21 7
In response, the Supreme Court formally recognized the possibility
of a right to privacy for one's personal information: "The cases
sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in fact involved at
least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."2"8
However, the Court held that the New York statute, on its face, did not
"pose a sufficiently grievous threat to either interest to establish a
constitutional violation., 219 In support of its decision, the Court noted
that New York ran its database "offline," so that no one outside the
computer room could access the information, and that a Department of
Health statute expressly prohibited public disclosure of the patients'
identities.220 Since the plaintiffs failed to show any instances where the
State of New York mishandled information in the database, the Court
216 Id. at 600. The plaintiffs presented parental testimony about their children's fear of
being stigmatized. Id. at 595 n.16. At least one child had already stopped taking
medication because of this concern. Id. Three adult patients testified as to their fear of
intentional or unintentional disclosure and the harm that would result. Id. One of those
patients even decided to obtain his drugs from another state. Id. Even though the court
recognized evidence that certain people were negatively affected by the New York
regulation, it refused to invalidate the statute because "about 100,000 prescriptions for such
drugs were being filled each month prior to the entry of the District Court's injunction.
Clearly, therefore, the statute did not deprive the public of access to the drugs." Id. at 603.
217 Id. at 600.
218 Id. at 598-600. In support of the first privacy interest, the right to avoid disclosure of
personal matters, the Court cited: Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (characterizing "the right to be let alone"
as "the right most valued by civilized men"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483
(1965) (recognizing that privacy is protected by the "penumbras" and "emanations" of the
Bill of Rights); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); California Bankers Ass'n v.
Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 79 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); California Bankers Ass'n v.
Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 79 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
219 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600.
220 Id. at 594-95. In the twenty months after the statute took effect, state officials only
used the information twice in investigations involving alleged drug abuse by patients. Id. at
595. Based on this information, the District Court held that the regulation was unnecessary.
Id. at 596. After pointing out that such Lochner-era reasoning was improper, the Supreme
Court disagreed, stating that "[sItate legislation which has some effect on individual liberty
or privacy may not be held unconstitutional simply because a court finds it unnecessary, in
whole or in part. Id. at 597.
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had no proof that these safeguards were insufficient to protect their
privacy interests."' Thus, the Court refused to enjoin the state's use of
the reporting program."
2. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services and the Right to
Personal Information Privacy
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services involved President
Nixon's challenge to the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act (Act).223 While President Nixon challenged the Act on
several grounds, none of which involved the Fourteenth Amendment,
the significant feature of Nixon is that the Court, citing Whalen v. Roe,
again recognized "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
221 Id. at 601-02. "There is no support in the record, or in the experience of the two
States that New York has emulated, for an assumption that the security provisions of the
statute will be administered improperly." Id. at 601. In a footnote, the Court discussed
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), where the Court refused to invalidate the reporting
requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 on the asserted ground that the
Act's disclosure requirements would prevent persons from contributing money to minority
parties. Id. at 601 n.27. According to the Court, "clearly articulated fears" are not enough
to enjoin a reporting requirement where the state has a legitimate interest in gathering the
information. Id. This is similar to the rational in Laird v. Tatum, supra Part IV(A)(1)(a)-
(c). According to Laird, "[a]llegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate substitute
for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm." Laird,
408 U.S. at 13-14.
Interestingly, the Court in Whalen recognized that certain people would refuse to take
medication because of the New York regulation. "Unquestionably, some individuals'
concern for their own privacy may lead them to avoid or to postpone needed medical
attention." Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602. However, it refused to invalidate the statute because
"about 100,000 prescriptions for such drugs were being filled each month prior to the entry
of the District Court's injunction. Clearly, therefore, the statute did not deprive the public of
access to the drugs." 1d. at 603.
222 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-04. "We hold that neither the immediate nor the threatened
impact of the patient-identification requirements in the New York State Controlled
Substances Act of 1972... is sufficient to constitute an invasion of any right or liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Since the Court was faced with a system
with adequate privacy safeguards, it did not "decide any question which might be presented
by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data - whether intentional or
unintentional - or by a system that did not contain comparable security provisions." Id. at
605-06. Several lower courts have addressed the appropriateness of finding information
privacy as a constitutional right. See Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d
Cir. 1983) ("Most courts considering the question.., appear to agree that privacy of
personal matters is a protected interest.").
223 See 433 U.S. 425 (1977). While Nixon's privacy challenge was under the First,
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, and not the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court's decision in
Nixon is significant in relation to this Article because it reaffirmed Whalen's suggestion that
the constitution does protect information privacy. See generally id.
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personal matters. 2 4 The Court held that Nixon did have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his presidential materials, but decided that it
would have to weigh this reasonable expectation against the public
interest in viewing Nixon's materials and the privacy safeguards
included in the Act. 25  "[Nixon's] claim of invasion of his privacy
cannot be considered in the abstract; rather, the claim must be
considered in light of the specific provisions of the Act, and any
intrusion must be weighed against the public interest in subjecting the
Presidential materials of [Nixon's] administration to archival
screening.,
226
Under this balancing test, the Court observed that Nixon's claim
227
was weaker than the claim presented in Whalen v. Roe. Only a small
portion of the "42 million pages of documents and 880 tape recordings"
in question actually qualified as private materials. 228 According to the
Court, "[n]ot only does the Act challenged here mandate regulations
similarly aimed at preventing undue dissemination of private materials
but, unlike Whalen, the Government will not even retain long-term
control over such private information; rather, purely private papers and
recordings will be returned to [Nixon] under ... the Act., 229 Thus, the
Court held that the Act contained sufficient privacy safeguards and that
the public interest in viewing the presidential materials outweighed any
small risk of improper disclosure.
224 Id. at 457 (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599).
225 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457-58.
226 Id. at 458.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 456. "[T]he Act 'is a reasonable response to the difficult problem caused by
the mingling of personal and private documents and conversations in the midst of a vastly
greater number of nonprivate documents and materials related to government objectives.'
Id.
229 Id. at 458-59.
230 Id. at 465. The Court did state that Nixon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his presidential materials. Id. at 457. However, it performed a balancing test to determine
whether that interest was outweighed by countervailing concerns. Id. at 456. The other
factors the Court considered included: the limited intrusion of the screening process, the fact
that an overwhelming majority of the materials were not private in nature, the public
interest in preserving the presidential materials, and the "impossibility of segregating the
small amount of private materials without comprehensive screening." Id. Furthermore,
according to the Court, the Act was sensitive to the President's privacy interests and the
archivists had an unblemished record of discretion. Id.
2004]
SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL
3. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Matrix
While the Court decided neither Whalen nor Nixon on behalf of the
plaintiffs, both cases suggested that, under the right circumstances, the
government's acquisition and recordation of information may violate
privacy rights under the Constitution."' The Whalen Court even
specifically announced a concern for the government's use of computer
databases: "[w]e are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized
data banks or other massive government files. 232 Accordingly, there is
a chance that the Court would invalidate a program like the Matrix if it
found that the program failed to meet Fourteenth Amendment privacy
standards.233
After Whalen and Nixon, the key to making this showing is
convincing the Court that the program's privacy safeguards are
insufficient."' In Whalen, for example, the plaintiffs failed on this
ground.235 Holding in favor of the State, the Court relied on the fact that
New York ran its database "offline," and only a limited number of state
officials had access to the system.236 Significantly, the plaintiffs did not
show specific instances where the State violated security provisions of
the program."'
Plaintiffs challenging the Matrix, however, should have an easier
time showing deficiencies in the program's privacy safeguards than
their counterparts did in Whalen. The Matrix system is not "offline,"
and numerous law enforcement officers in the participating states can
access the database.2 38 Additionally, a private company operates the
Matrix, and Hank Asher, the company's founder, has a significant
criminal record.29 "In 1999, the Drug Enforcement Administration and
the FBI suspended information service contracts with an earlier Asher-
231 Turkington, supra note 208, at 498.
232 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
233 See id.
234 See id.; Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 457-58 (1977).
235 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 594-95.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 601. "There is no support in the record, or in the experience of the two States
that New York has emulated, for an assumption that the security provisions of the statute
will be administered improperly." Id.
238 See DATA MINING MOVES INTO THE STATES, supra note 100; Gast, supra note 9, at F1.
239 See O'Harrow, supra note 1; Craig, supra note 144.
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run company because of concerns about his past."''
This combination of factors makes the privacy safeguards of the
Matrix far less protective than those found in Whalen. However,
because of the program's age and Matrix officials' unwillingness to
release information about the systems operation, plaintiffs challenging
the Matrix probably will not be able to show specific instances where
Matrix officials mishandled personal information. Consequently, the
reviewing court probably will not assume that Matrix officials or the
participating states will use the information improperly.
2 41
The court may also employ a balancing test, similar to the one in
Nixon, and weigh the potential privacy risk against the public interest in
"national security."2 42 Considering the current conservative nature of the
Supreme Court,243 if the case ever proceeds that far, "national security"
will almost certainly outweigh threats to individual privacy, especially
if plaintiffs cannot produce specific examples of how Matrix, or state
officials, improperly used information contained in the database.2"
Thus, a reviewing court, similar to the Court in Whalen, might allow
Florida to act as a testing ground for the experimental law enforcement
program.245
240 O'Harrow, supra note 1. Asher is a former drug smuggler and was once accused of
participating in a plot to assassinate former Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega. See id.;
Craig, supra note 144.
241 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 601. This was a significant factor in the Whalen Court's
decision in favor of the state. Id.
242 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 465. "National security" is a common justification for passing
legislation or establishing programs that diminish civil liberties such as privacy. See supra
Part II. For example, Matrix officials justify their program on its potential to combat
terrorism. See STATE OF GEORGIA, supra note 96, at 1. However, "[e]ven though Matrix is
ostensibly set up to allow law enforcement officials to fight terrorism and crime, data about
perfectly law-abiding citizens makes up the predominant portion of that database." Gast,
supra note 9 (statement of Gerald M. Haskins, Professor of Computer and Information
Science and Engineering, University of Florida). The real justification for the Matrix
system is that it will enhance police departments' power to conduct everyday law
enforcement activities, not to fight terrorism. See Dreyfuss, supra note 88.
243 See DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUiST SUPREME
CouRT (1992). In an article Chief Justice Rehnquist authored in the mid-1970s, he
expressed concerns about expanding the right of privacy at the expense of effective law
enforcement. William Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair
and Effective Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You've Come a Long Way, Baby, 23 KAN. L.
REV. 1 (1974).
244 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). If plaintiffs challenging the
Matrix cannot show a harm that is likely to be repeated in the future, they may lose on
standing grounds because of Lyons. See id.
245 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597. On this point, the Whalen Court cited Justice
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C. Encouraging Legislative Action
Since so little is known about the Matrix itself and how Matrix or
state officials use information contained within the system, courts
currently may be unable to invalidate the program on privacy grounds.246
However, legislatures in participating states are not so restricted and
may ban news gathering technology if they: (1) do so through a law of
general application, and (2) reasonably tailor the ban to achieve some
legitimate governmental objective.247 Privacy is certainly such an
objective.2 8 Therefore, considering the judiciary's current inability to
address the privacy threat of the Matrix, state legislatures have a
responsibility to act. As the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia stated in Menard v. Mitchell:
A heavy burden is placed on all branches of Government to maintain
a proper equilibrium between the acquisition of information and the
necessity to safeguard privacy. Systematic recordation and
dissemination of information about individual citizens is a form of
surveillance and control which may easily inhibit freedom to speak,
to work and to move about in this land.
249
There are two ways state legislatures can act to circumscribe the
Matrix's operations. First, similar to how Congress shut down the TIA,
state legislatures can pass moratoriums on funding for the Matrix
program, effectively forcing their respective states to drop out of the
system.2 50 Starting in 2004, federal funding for the program will end and
Brandeis's dissent in New State Ice Company, which stated:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to
the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
Id. at 597 n.20 (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
246 See supra Part IV.B.
247 See Froomkin, supra note 128, at 1510.
248 See id.
249 Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Menard involved a
request to remove the plaintiff's fingerprints from criminal records maintained by the FBI.
Id. at 720. The plaintiff was detained and arrested, but never prosecuted. Id. at 723. Thus,
the plaintiff requested that his fingerprints be removed from the criminal system. Id. at 720.
The court refused. See id. at 727-28.
250 See Hulse, supra note 4. Out of the eighteen states that either signed the original
Matrix agreement or considered joining the Matrix system, only five remain. See Johnson,
supra note 143. Of the five remaining, at least two states, Connecticut and Ohio, are
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the Matrix will cost each participating state about $1.5 million per year
in membership fees alone.25" ' Cost is a major concern for every
participating state and every state that is considering joining the
system. In fact, every state that has dropped out of the Matrix has
listed cost as one of the factors in its decision.253 With each state that
chooses to deny funding for membership fees - thereby withdrawing
from the program - the Matrix loses a significant portion of the data it
once contained and its usefulness to existing and potential member
states diminishes. 4
Alternatively, state legislatures may choose to enact certain privacy
measures that restrict the Matrix's operations. 55 Such measures may
include limitations on the types of information that a state contributes to
the database or limitations on how Matrix users may utilize the
information contained within the system.56 Yet, if a state legislature
decides to simply limit the scope of the state's participation in the
Matrix, rather than dropping out altogether, it should clearly define the
limitations it imposes and place an absolute prohibition on future
expansions of the state's use of the Matrix system. Government
programs that collect personal information often suffer from "mission
creep," which refers to the risk than an initially justifiable government
reconsidering their membership. See Chedekel, supra note 144; Craig, supra note 144. In
Connecticut, lawmakers in the state recently scheduled hearings to determine whether the
program's usefulness outweighs privacy concerns. See Chedekel, supra note 144. In Ohio,
the Governor has decided to review the State's involvement. See Craig, supra note 144.
251 Chesto, supra note 145. The Florida Legislature has already allocated $1.6 million to
pay Seislnt for its work. O'Harrow, supra note 1.
252 See Johnson, supra note 143.
253 See id.
254 See id.
255 See, e.g., Chedekel, supra note 144 (quoting State Representative Michael Lawlor:
"We're prepared to write some privacy safeguards into the law, or, if necessary, to force the
state to withdraw from the program."). But see DeVries, supra note 27, at 291
("[L]egislatures are unlikely to impose many new limits on government misuse of personal
information in the current atmosphere of heightened national security and fear.").
256 See, e.g., Duane D. Stanford & Joey Ledford, State Can't Give Driver Records to the
Matrix, ATLANTA J. CoNsT., Oct. 21, 2003, at AI ("Georgia's attorney general said Monday
it would be illegal for the state to turn over millions of driver records to the Matrix crime-
fighting database being developed in Florida."). Another way to limit the privacy threat of
the Matrix would be for states to lobby Matrix officials to design the system so that users
could not connect personal information in the database with an individual's name "unless
the system indicated a significant risk for terrorism or other violent crimes." See Rosen,
supra note 106.
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program can evolve into a much larger unjustifiable version of itself.257
Consider the 1996 law requiring employers to make quarterly reports
on the name, address, Social Security number and wages of each of
their employees to the Department of Health and Human Services.
The intent of the legislation was to track deadbeat dads. Yet those
reports now also go to the Social Security Administration to verify
unemployment reports, to the Treasury to cross-check tax deductions
and even to the Department of Education to help it find individuals
delinquent on their student loans.
258
Thus, even if state legislatures initially limit the scope of the
Matrix system, the risk is very high that sometime in the future - after
the initial uproar over the program settles down - law enforcement
officials, other branches of government, or maybe even the legislature
itself will lobby for expanding the scope of the program to include
other, more controversial, uses.
To protect against this risk, state legislatures that choose to remain
in the system should establish an independent privacy oversight board
to monitor their state's use of the Matrix. 2' 9  The purpose of the
oversight committee would be "to protect those persons with whose
affairs the community has no legitimate concern." If states choose to
maintain their membership in the Matrix, some form of external
oversight is necessary to protect individuals' privacy rights from
governmental excess. The privacy oversight board would both monitor
its state's participation in the Matrix and serve as a check on future
legislative action that may attempt to broaden the scope of the program.
V. Conclusion
United States history reveals that state and federal governments
often rely on "national security" as a rationale for expanding their
257 Peter P. Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government
Surveillance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 498 (1999).
258 Melanie Scarborough, Big Brother Virginia, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2003, at B8.
Also consider the expanded use of the Social Security Number. When it was introduced
during the New Deal, President Roosevelt reassured the public that it would not become a
national identity card. Id. Over time, however, the SSN has essentially become just that.
See Swire, supra note 257, at 498.
259 External audits were a common feature in the Red Squad settlements of the 1970s.
See Chevigny, supra note 69, at 752-57.
260 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 11, at 214.
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governing powers at the expense of constitutional rights.26" ' From the
Alien and Sedition Acts to the excesses of the FBI and CIA, the United
States government has habitually overstepped its constitutional powers
when faced with a pending national crisis.
Unfortunately, these governmental failures did not result from
informed and rational decisions that upholding civil liberties would
create unacceptable security risks.262 Rather, these poor choices were
the product of the intermittent nature of our nation's security crises.263
As Justice Brennan once stated, "[t]he inexperience of decisionmakers
in dealing with wartime security claims makes them reluctant to
question the factual bases underlying asserted security threats." '264
Consequently, the decision to increase national security at the expense
of civil liberties is frequently flawed, and, according to Justice Brennan,
"[a]fter each perceived security crisis ended, the United States has
remorsefully realized that the abrogation of civil liberties was
unnecessary." '265
Nevertheless, the United States seems unable to Fprevent itself from
repeating this error during times of perceived crisis.2" The current "war
on terror," for example, has spawned several government surveillance
initiatives nominally aimed at fighting terrorism. Yet, these programs
have the effect of monitoring the everyday activities of ordinary
Americans. The Matrix is no exception. Eventually, stories of
government excess regarding the Matrix system will emerge, and courts
will have the ability to prevent the program's needless invasion of
privacy. Until then, state legislatures are the only governmental bodies
capable of imposing limitations on the program's reach and guarding
their citizens against the program's constitutional excess.
261 Murray & Wunsch, supra note 14, at 73.
262 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in
Times of Security Crises, Address at the Law School of Hebrew University 1 (Dec. 22,
1987), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/resources/downloads/nationsecurity
brennan.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
263 Id.
264 Id. at 2.
265 Id. at 1.
266 Id. "For as adamant as my country has been about civil liberties during peacetime, it
has a long history of failing to preserve civil liberties when it perceived its national security
threatened." Id. According to Brennan, courts should accept some of the responsibility for
failing to establish safeguards or policies that protect civil liberties. Id. "The peacetime
jurisprudence of civil liberties leaves the nation without a tradition of, or detailed theoretical
basis for, sustaining civil liberties against particularized security concerns." Id.
20041

